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Symposium Articles

Paradigm Regained: How Competition from
Accounting Firms May Help Corporate
Attorneys to Recapture the Ethical
High Ground
Peter C. Kostant*
I.

Introduction

Accounting firms have grown enormously in size and in the
variety of services that they provide to corporate clients. Now
calling themselves Multi-Disciplinary Practices [hereinafter
MDPs],' accounting firms have recently hired many licensed attorneys. They now provide not just tax assistance, but also
most types of legal services, with the exception of actually ap2
pearing in court on behalf of clients.
* Associate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. I would like
to thank Dean Harvey Rishikof and acting Dean Bruce Kogan for a summer research grant. Professors John Humbach and Jonathan Gutoff, and Edward M.
Medici, Esq., were kind enough to make helpful suggestions. Rory Fazendeiro and
Dory Ricci provided useful research assistance. Professor Gail Winson and her
entire team of extraordinary law librarians also provided valuable help. I would
also like to thank my secretaries Theresa Krusczek and Pauline Borges for their
patient and cheerful assistance.
1. Competition from MDPs was a driving force in motivating the American
Bar Association (hereinafter "ABA") to analyze the general problems of competition for legal services from non-lawyers. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of Delegates released its recommendations on
June 8, 1999. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text; see also The ABA
Commission on MultidisciplinaryPracticeReport to the House of Delegates (June 8,
1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalreport.html>.
2. In fact, they have recently been empowered to appear in tax court, and
under some circumstances non-lawyer practitioners can provide a limited version
of the attorney-client privilege. Historically, tax related services have actually
been performed by American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' members

1

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:43

Not surprisingly, the organized bar has responded to this
new competition with gloomy predictions about the end of professional legal ethics as we know them. At the Pace Law Review Symposium, James Moore, quoting the present chairman
of the MDP task force for the American Bar Association [hereinafter ABA], called competition from accountants "not the greatest threat to the legal profession in a generation, but in this
century."3 Another eloquent spokesperson for the "organized"
legal profession, Lawrence Fox, former chair of the American
Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics, has furnished a
"parade of horribles," where clients will no longer have the benefits of strict confidentiality, protection from conflicts of interest
will attenuate to the point of being meaningless, and the illustrious American bar will lose its cherished independence. 4 Ironically, all that this means for the large public corporations that
are employing MDPs is that their audit committees, comprised
of independent directors, will learn all of the material information that their lawyers know.
Whether or not it is a good thing, competition from MDPs is
now a reality for American law firms. Currently, the rules that
govern MDPs differ from those governing law firms. 5 Perhaps
and their firms. Except for tax advice by accounting firms and other "paraprofessionals," "the organized bar has successfully policed the market for legal services
in the United States." Mary C. Daly, The Cultural,Ethical, and Legal Challenges
in Lawyering for a Global Organization:The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1085 (1997). The tax privilege was formally recognized under the
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, promulgated as section 7525 of the
Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 7525 (West 1999). The change in the law
extends the common law privilege of confidentiality between a client or possible
future client and her attorney to tax advice "furnished to a client-taxpayer (or potential client-taxpayer) by any individual who is authorized under Federal law to
practice before the IRS." S. REP. No. 105-174, at 70 (1998). This privilege may be
claimed in any non-criminal tax proceeding before the IRS or in the federal courts
where the IRS is a party to the proceeding. See id. The privilege, however, may
not be asserted to prevent the disclosure of information to any regulatory body
other than the IRS. See id.
3. James C. Moore, Lawyers and Accountants: Is the Delivery of Legal Services
Through the MultidisciplinaryPracticein the Best Interests of Clients and the Public?, 20 PACE L. REV. 33, 33 (1999) (quoting remarks made by Sherwin Simmons at
the American Bar Association House of Delegates meeting in Los Angeles, California on Feb. 8, 1999).
4. Lawrence J. Fox, Fightingfor Independence, 61 PHILA. LAw. 28, 28 (1998).
5. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of
Delegates released its recommendations on June 8, 1999. See infra notes 52-59 and
accompanying text. See also The ABA Commission on MultidisciplinaryPractice
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the most important difference concerns client confidentiality.
Clients of traditional law firms receive an absolute attorney-client evidentiary privilege, 6 strict confidentiality, 7 and the protection, where applicable, of the work-product rule.8 Clients of
MDPs receive much less expansive confidentiality and no evidentiary privilege or work product protection. 9 Under current
law, an MDP that provides auditing services to a client must
disclose all material information when certifying financial
statements. The duty to disclose presumably includes information that attorneys working for the MDP attorneys have
learned. 10 This "watchdog"1 ' duty for accounting firms became
clearer in 1995 when Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act.' 2 Audit firms are now required to notify the Secur-

Report to the House of Delegates (June 8, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdpfinalreport.html>.
6. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2296,
at 566 (McNaughton ed. 1961) (providing the eight elements of the attorney-client
privilege). See also In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988).
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1999). The text of
the rule states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except
as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (giving
protection to written materials obtained or produced by counsel in anticipation of
litigation).
9. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
10. See Fox, supra note 4, at 28.
11. Quinton F. Seamons, Audit Standards and Detection of Fraud Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 259, 259 n.1
(1996).
12. The Act became law on December 22, 1995. See id. at 260 n.2; see also
infra note 13.
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ities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC] of suspected
fraud within one day of the client's failure to correct it.13
This article will accept the important premise about MDP
competition that Fox decries, namely, that MDPs have a duty,
when acting as auditors, to disclose materially harmful information that their lawyers may learn. 14 Rather than causing
harm, however, this clarified duty will actually benefit all interested parties: transactional corporate clients, third parties and
the legal profession. This article attempts to bring a new perspective to the "crisis in professionalism" 15 discourse by arguing
that the legal profession should allow MDP competition. If al13. In 1995, Congress adopted Section 301 of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, which requires audit procedures "designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts "that would have a direct and material effect on financial statements." Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
§ 301, 109 Stat. 737. Pursuant to Section 10A, the SEC may modify audit procedures and discipline accountants who fail to meet these new standards. See id.
§10A. In addition to the "substantial change" that makes auditors watchdogs or
detectives, it also makes them whistleblowers. If an accountant detects or becomes
aware of information indicating that an illegal act has or may have occurred, regardless of materiality, she must determine whether it is likely that an illegal act
has occurred, and if it is likely, she shall consider the possible effect of the illegal
act on the financial statements. The auditor must, as soon as "practical," inform
the appropriate level of management and assure that the audit committee (or
board of directors if there is no audit committee) is adequately informed, unless
the illegal act is "clearly inconsequential." If the auditor concludes that the illegal
act has a material effect on the financial statements, but senior management and
the board have not taken timely and appropriate remedial action, and such nonaction is reasonably expected to warrant departure from a standard audit report or
warrant resignation by the accountant, the auditor must state this conclusion in a
Section 10A Report to the board of directors. See Seamons, supra note 11, at 263.
The board then must notify the SEC of the Report within one business day. If the
board does not act within one business day, the accountant must resign, triggering
the requirement that the client file a Report Form 8-K, and the accountant must
notify the SEC within one business day. Accountants who fall to comply with Section 10A whistleblowing are subject to civil penalties. See id. Section 1OA(c) provides a safeharbor protecting accountants from civil liability for whistleblowers.
See id. § 1OA(c). For a helpful discussion of this new statute, see Seamons, supra
note 11, at 262-63.
14. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
15. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100
YALE L.J. 1239 (1991); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71
IND. L.J. 911 (1996) (discussing the poor image of lawyers and arguing that any
improvement must derive from the concerted efforts of law schools and the bar);
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (1993) (discussing the American legal profession crisis and reaching the
"gloomy conclusion" that the lawyer-statesman ideal is a thing of the past). Id.
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lowed to take hold, it could lead to a new model for transactional corporate practice where lawyers can better serve clients,
and also feel greater professional satisfaction. 16
This article suggests that the duty of strict confidentiality,
as currently interpreted by the organized bar, which can be provided only by lawyers in law firms, is either generally unnecessary for large corporate clients, or is actually counterproductive
to their welfare. Thus, one of the reasons that large corporations may be eager to hire MDPs to provide legal services is that
MDPs employ confidentiality in a more nuanced and valuable
manner.
Part II of this article will discuss some recent developments
in MDP competition and the response of the organized bar.
Part III examines some reasons for the general crisis of legal
professionalism, and the increasingly negative public perception of lawyers. Part IV argues that the traditional dichotomy
in transactional practice between the role of accountant and
lawyer is not a valid basis for separating the professions. Part
V suggests that transactional lawyers working for MDP auditors who take on an auditor's duty to disclose harmful material
information might well provide a greater value for their clients
and behave more like the lawyer-statesmen of the past. 17 Part
V also explains how the new MDP paradigm of transactional
law might work by taking a look at a traditional area of legal
practice, patent law,' 8 in which lawyers have always been held
to a standard of complete candor. In this practice, full disclo16. Some commentators have criticized Anthony Kronman's, THE LOST LAWfor centering on lawyers'
needs rather than the clients' needs. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, PracticalWisdom
for PracticingLawyers: SeparatingIdeals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARv.
L. REV. 458, 459, 469-71 (1994). My suggestions are for better serving corporate
clients with increased lawyer satisfaction as a beneficial by-product. See also WiLLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER'S ETHICS 111-37
(1998) (discussing the alienation problem caused by the absence of meaningful
work, as lawyers, under the dominant view, may become participants in causing
injustice).
17. See KRoNMAN, supra note 15, at 11-17, 364-72 (developing the concept of
the "lawyer-statesman"); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 54-56 (1988) (stressing traditional need for attorney independence);
Daniel R. Coquillette, Professionalism:The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1271,
1271-77 (1994) (observing decline in importance of attorney's duty to third parties
and society).
18. See infra notes 135-147 and accompanying text.
YER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)

5

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:43

sure has worked in a regulatory context and clients have not
been harmed.
II.

The Perceived "Crisis" 19 for the Legal Profession from
Accounting Firm Competition

Throughout the world, the Big Five accounting firms 20 are
aggressively competing with law firms for legal business. The
President of the American Bar Association has said that it is
"no secret" that the Big Five intend to offer legal consulting
services in the United States. 21 Accounting firms are providing
law-related services in the United States that include not only
tax, but also advice in business planning, capital markets,
mergers and acquisitions, corporate and securities transactions,
and employment and employee benefits. 22 In addition to these
"business law" areas, accounting firms have also provided litigation support, case valuation, investigation, and alternative dis19. The Chinese word for "crisis," wei ji is comprised of two characters: wei,
meaning danger; and ji, meaning opportunity or chance. This article will examine
the opportunities presented by what many legal commentators are calling the
crisis of accounting firm competition.
20. Currently the Big Five are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. Rather than calling themselves
accounting firms, they now prefer to be known as "professional service firms."
Ward Bower, A Look at the Rise of MultidisciplinaryPartnerships,61 PHILA. LAw.
28, 32 n.1 (1998).
This global competition began in Germany, which has permissive rules that
allow non-lawyers to own firms that practice law. See id. at 27. Countries that
allow true MDPs include Germany and Australia. See id. In countries that do not
yet allow for these mergers, accounting firms typically form contractual networks
for close cooperation with law firms. See id. at 30. For example, in France, KPMG
is affiliated with Fidal which employs 1000 lawyers. See id. at 27. Accounting
firms have these close network relations with law firms in Hong Kong, Singapore,
Canada and in much of Africa and Latin America. See id.
In 1998, Arthur Andersen was reported to employ 1500 lawyers making it the
world's second largest law firm. See Howard C. Coker, Ancillary Businesses -An
Economic Opportunity Or an Ethical Dilemma Threatening Our Profession, Florida Bar Journal (Nov. 1, 1998) <http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/publicmediainfo/
tfbjournal/nov98-pr.html>.
21. John Gibeaut & James Podgers, Feeling the Squeeze: Commission Appointed to Assess Threat from Accountants, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 88. The ABA
Task Force Report on MDP Competition was submitted to the ABA House of Delegates in August, 1999.
22. See Bower, supra note 20, at 27; Gianluca Morello, Big Six Accounting
Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multi-DisciplinePractices Should be
Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 190 (1997).
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23 These services are generally characterized as
pute resolution.
"consulting"24 or "advice and consultation ... [with] legal components" 25 because, with the exception of the District of Columbia, no jurisdiction in the United States allows firms owned
26
wholly or in part by non-lawyers to provide legal services.
Whatever one calls them, these services constitute a "significant
threat"27 to law firms. While state ethics rules formally ban
28
pure MDPs in the United States, there is "tacit acceptance" of
competition for legal services from MDPs. These firms "continue to flourish"29 and "not a single lawyer in an accounting
23. Bower, supra note 20, at 27.
24. Statement of Kathryn A. Oberly Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/oberlyl.html>.
25. Id.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1999).
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except
that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time
after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified
persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the
estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase
price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part
on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the
activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays
the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the
lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.
Only the District of Columbia has amended Rule 5.4 to allow certain lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships. See Morello, supra note 22, at 195.
27. See Morello, supra note 22, at n.13.
28. See Fox, supra note 4, at 29.
29. See Bower, supra note 20, at 30.
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firm has been disciplined." 30 To date, most accounting firms
have been competing with big U.S. law firms for large corporate
clients. 31 MDPs often advise on complex, international transactions for highly sophisticated clients involving an "inextricable
32
mix of finance, accounting, law and other disciplines."
A.

The Response From the Legal Profession

Much of the response by the organized bar to the new competition has been harsh, indignant, and conclusory. 33 Lawrence
Fox argues that attorneys working for accounting firms violate
their ethical duties "every day" and "ignore systematically, and

34
with impunity, the major ethical precepts for which we stand."

Fox believes that only lawyers in law firms should be permitted
to practice law. He contrasts the practices of law firms with
those of accounting firms, 35 and concludes that accounting
firms have lax rules about conflicts of interest, permit misleading advertising, and allow non-competition agreements. 36 Fox
postulates that lawyers who do not exclusively own their own
firms will inevitably lose their professional independence. 37
Perhaps, most importantly, Fox concludes that the new compe30. See Fox, supra note 4, at 29.
31. See Morello, supra note 22, at 192-93. One big firm partner concluded: "It
sounds like the bean counters are outcompeting and outinnovating us." Id. at 190.
32. Testimony of Stefan F. Tucker Before the Commission on ABA Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/tuckerl.html>.
33. Commentators like David Wilkins have argued that questions about the
regulation of lawyers require concrete comparative institutional analysis. See
David B. Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers? Managing Conflict and Context in Professional Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
465 (1996). In responding to accounting firm competition, the organized bar has
avoided critical examination of its assumptions and has instead relied upon folklore, intuition, and a fervent belief that its self-interest is justified. This is consistent with the general absence of analysis of the dominant model. See SIMON, supra
note 16, at 7-11.
34. See Fox, supra note 4, at 28. Non-competition agreements among lawyers
are generally deemed unenforceable as against public policy because they interfere
with client authority.
35. See id. at 29.
36. See id.
37. This is the traditional rationale for the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.4. Leading commentators argue that the decisive rationale for this
provision is "economic protectionism." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 799 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/4

8

1999]

PARADIGM REGAINED

51

tition victimizes clients because they lose the precious protec38
tion of attorney confidentiality.
Fox's dichotomy is clear. Accountants who are auditors
must disclose harmful material information, while lawyers
must preserve client confidences. Accounting firms that perform audits for clients, for whom they also provide legal services, would be required to disclose all material information that
any of their lawyers learn. To be sure, clients have the right to
waive confidentiality in advance, 39 alleviating this conflict between roles. Fox, however, becomes quite passionate about this
suggestion. "As you and I know," he concludes, "confidentiality
40
is a protection we never ask our clients to waive."
B.

The Response of Accounting Firms

One area of rhetorical agreement in this discourse is that
the only important factor in the debate over competition is client welfare. Not surprisingly, each group reaches a different
conclusion. 41 The accounting profession denies the existence of
the dangers to clients that the organized bar stresses. Their
usual argument is that the ABA's Model Rule of Professional
38. See Fox, supra note 4, at 29.
39. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 37, 5.4:102, at 798. Rule 1.6 expressly
allows clients to consent to any disclosure. "A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation .... " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Model Rule 1.6 (1999)
(emphasis added).
40. See Fox, supra note 4, at 28. Fox, an eminent litigator, does not even consider the needs of clients in non-litigation contexts. University of Chicago Law
School Dean Daniel Fischel also observed that the legal profession, albeit out of
self-interest, has formulated rules that discourage the waiver of confidentiality.
See Fischel, infra note 64, at 21. One of the most exciting aspects of MDP competition is the potential willingness of clients to waive confidentiality. This directly
challenges a bedrock principle of legal ethics, which Stanford Law School Professor
William Simon has called the profession's "sacred cow." William H. Simon, The
Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of
Evasion and Apology, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 281 (1998) ("confidentiality is a
sacred cow in professional discourse"). The Kutak Commission, which drafted the
Model Rules, attempted to liberalize an attorney's ethical duties in disclosing confidential information in order to protect third parties. The ABA rejected the liberalizing proposals and adopted Model Rules in 1983 that were more restrictive
about disclosure than the prior Model Code of 1969 had been. See also Fischel,
infra note 64, at 21.
41. See Bower, supra note 20, at 30.
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Conduct [hereinafter Model Rule] 5.4 is nothing more than
transparent economical protectionism for law firms, and provides no meaningful protection for clients. 42 Yet, knowledgeable
clients are flocking to MDPs for the convenience of one-stop
shopping. Lawyers working for accounting firms are no less independent than in-house lawyers working in corporations. No
one has even suggested that employee lawyers cannot meet
their ethical duties. Moreover, in addition to gaining the protection of the model rules, clients of MDPs might further benefit
because the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'
[hereinafter AICPA] Code of Professional Conduct Rule 10243
requires independent judgment by lawyers working in accounting firms. Disclosure, Chinese Walls, and informed consent can
prevent conflicts of interest among MDP clients. 4 4
Some have argued that the purported loss of protection of
client confidentiality is really a red herring. One Big Five general counsel testified that there is "little real conflict" 45 between
protecting client confidences and making full disclosure in audits.46 While confidentiality flows to clients, counsel should always advise their corporate clients to make full disclosure to
their auditors. She explains that companies recognize an independent duty to disclose all material information to their auditors regardless of the attorney-client privilege. 47 Auditors,
who do not receive complete and candid information, must re48
sign or qualify their opinions.
In a similar vein, Stefan Tucker, Chair of the American Bar
Association Tax Section, concluded that there is no need to
change Model Rule 1.649 since it already allows clients to consent to the disclosure of confidences. According to Tucker, the
"concept of privilege is eroding in today's world" and truly informed clients will always consent to full disclosure to their au42. See Statement of Kathryn Oberly, supra note 24. The Kutak Commission
attempted to make Rule 5.4 flexible and meaningful but the ABA completely rejected its draft proposals and instead retained the protectionist policy of the Model
Code. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 37, at 5.4:101, 102, at 796-99.
43. See Statement of Kathryn Oberly, supra note 24.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Statement of Kathryn Oberly, supra note 24.
49. See supra note 7 (providing the text of Model Rule 1.6).
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ditors because it is always in their best interests. 50 He
concludes that when problems arise, they result not from auditors learning of client "confidences," but from lawyers failing to
51
communicate fully and candidly with the client.
C.

The Response of the American Bar Association

On June 8, 1999, the ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice issued a Report with unanimous recommendations that would allow MDPs to deliver legal services. 52 The
report failed completely to address the key problem of MDPs
providing legal services - the necessity of disclosing confidential information to the audit partner who, under certain circumstances, would then have a duty of disclosure. Instead, the
Report merely postulates that lawyers in MDPs must provide
53
the same confidentiality to their clients as law firms.
The commission's recommendations received such severe
criticism that they have been tabled, and were not submitted to
the ABA House of Delegates in August, 1999 as planned. 54 One
criticism was that lawyers would lose their professional independence if non-lawyers were able to share in profits. 55 More
telling was the refusal of the bar to recognize that a universal
50. Testimony of Stefan F. Tucker, supra note 32.
51. Id. Tucker believes these failures may result from incompetence, lack of
diligence or promptness, arrogance or some combination of these shortcomings.
52. See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), <http:ll
www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html>.
53. Thus, the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice missed the opportunity to analyze the advantages that contextual rules could provide for the transactional lawyers, including a different standard for confidentiality.
The Report only acknowledges that the Securities and Exchange Commission
believes that "auditor independence regulations specifically state that the roles of
auditors and attorneys under the federal securities laws are incompatible, and
that the SEC has asked the Independence Standards Board for guidance about
auditor independence in connection with legal services. In fact, as discussed infra
at notes 58-59 and accompanying text, the SEC criticism has been more severe.
54. On August 9, 1999, the ABA House of Delegates "overwhelmingly voted to
defer approval of multidisciplinary practices . . . until they are proven to be no
threat to the lawyers' independence." Darryl Van Duch, ABA Honchos Differ Over
MDP Vote, 21 NAT. L.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at A6. This means that more hearings on
MDPs are necessary and that the ABA could consider additional proposals before
any changes are implemented. See No MultidisciplinaryPractice for Now: ABA
House of Delegates Refuses to Consider Changes Without More Study, 85 A.B.A. J.
23 (Sept. 1999).
55. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 37, 5.4:102, at 798.
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set of ethical rules is harmful to a profession that provides services in different contexts. Thus, the New York County Lawyers
Association adopted a resolution condemning the proposal because it would "'undermine the advocacy commitment of the
legal profession' and compromise the profession's duty to the client."5 6 Similarly, Thomas 0. Rice, New York State Bar Association President, condemned the proposal for undermining
"zealous and effective legal advocacy."5 7
The SEC, too, opposed the ABA Commission's proposal, but
on the grounds that it would compromise auditor independence.
"The SEC will continue vigorous enforcement of its rules on auditor independence.., those rules prohibit an auditor from certifying the financial statements of a client with which his firm
also has an attorney-client relationship."5 8 The SEC intends to
56. Debate on Multidisciplinary Practice Report Continues as Vote by ABA
Delegates Nears, 68 U.S.L.W. 2020 (Jul. 13, 1999).
57. Id.
58. Letter from Harvey J. Goldschmid, SEC General Counsel, Lynn E. Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, and Richard H. Walker, SEC Director of Enforcement
to Philip S. Anderson, President, American Bar Association (July 12, 1999). The
SEC's auditor independence regulations specifically state that the roles of auditors
and attorneys under the federal securities laws are incompatible. Rule 2-01(c) of
Regulation S-X, 17 CFR 210.2-01(c) states that in determining whether an accountant is independent of a particular person, the Commission "will give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing on
all relationships between the accountant and that person or any affiliate thereof,
and will not confine itself to the relationships existing in connection with the filing
of reports with the Commission." 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c) (1988). The Commission
further stated in an interpretive release, which has been incorporated into its Codification of Financial Reporting Polices ("Codification"), that one of the relationships that must be considered in making independence determinations is the
relationship created by rendering legal services. The Commission stated,
"Certain concurrent occupations of accountants engaged in the practice of
public accounting involve relationships with clients which may jeopardize
the accountant's objectivity, and, therefore, his independence. In general,
this situation arises because the relationships and activities customarily associated with this occupation are not compatible with the auditor's appearance of complete objectivity or because the primary objectives of such
occupations are fundamentally different from those of a public accountant
"A legal counsel enters into a personal relationship with a client and is primarily concerned with the personal rights and interest of such client. An
independent accountant is precluded from such a relationship under the Securities Acts because the role is inconsistent with the appearance of independence required of accountants in reporting to public investors."
Codification 602.02.e.i. and e.ii. 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,267, 73,268,
at 62,903 (Apr. 27, 1988).
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bring enforcement proceedings for violations of independence
59
against any firm that provides legal services to audit clients.
Thus, both the organized bar and the SEC have missed an opportunity to allow lawyers to act in a manner that would revitalize a profession much in need of a lift.
III.

The General Crisis of the Legal Profession

Few would dispute that the American legal profession is in
a state of malaise. 60 Law firm personnel turnover is enormous;
61
client defections are epidemic; venerable firms are disbanding;
and the Mickey Mantle-like attorney that spends her entire ca62
reer with one firm is becoming a rarity. The bottom line rules.
One especially knowledgeable commentator, the Reporter for
the ABA's Model Rules, Professor Geoffrey Hazard, has con63
cluded that the legal profession is in "crisis."
As attorney job satisfaction reaches its nadir, the public
reputation of lawyers has also reached an all-time low. Movie
audiences in suburban malls cheer when the JurassicPark Tyrannosaur eats the lawyer. Lawyer jokes have their own web
site (e.g., "How many lawyers does it take to shingle a roof?" "It
depends on how thin you slice them."). Most people do not trust
59. See In re Falk, CPA, Exchange Act Release No. 34-41424, 69 S.E.C. Docket
1916 (May 19, 1999). In this case, an attorney/CPA provided legal services to a
corporation that was an audit client of the firm in which he was a principal. See id.
While he did not participate as engagement partner or concurring partner on any
of the clients audits, he declined to answer questions about the legal representation, relying on attorney client privilege. See id. The SEC found that Falk had
violated the standards of auditor independence because of the "fumdamental conflict between the roles of independent auditor and attorney." Id. The SEC, citing
United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1994), explained that auditors must be "skeptical," which requires "total independence," while lawyers have
"a duty to serve as the client's confidential advisor and loyal advocate." The SEC
also pointed to the requirement in Model Rule 1.3 that a lawyer must act "with
zeal in advocacy on the clients behalf." See In re Falk, CPA, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-41424 (May 19, 1999).
60. See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 15; KRONMAN, supra note 15; Hazard, supra
note 15.
61. Shea & Gould; Lord, Day & Lord; Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander &
Ferdon; Gaston & Snow; Marshall, Bratter, Greene, Allison & Tucker; and Finley,
Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey are a few of the
famous, large firms to have disbanded recently.
62. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand
Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 870-72 (1990).
63. Hazard, supra note 15, at 1239.
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lawyers, and some experts even complain that lawyers are
merely parasitic rent seekers who enrich themselves without
adding value. 64 It may be hard to believe, but it was not always
this way. Many people delight in the speech, "First we kill all
the lawyers," from Shakespeare's "Henry VI," as validation of
the low esteem in which lawyers have traditionally been held. 65
Lawyers once derived dignity from the shared belief that
they were learned, independent professionals who were reasonably unpolluted by the marketplace. 66 Today, few would describe lawyers in this way. Instead, the public generally views
even rich and powerful lawyers as servants of big business. 67
Therefore, lawyers were affected when the reputation of big
business, which has been deteriorating since the Great Depression, plummeted during the takeover frenzy of the 1980s.68
64. See generally STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., THE INVISIBLE FOOT AND THE
WASTE OF NATIONS: LAwYERS AS NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES, IN BLACK HOLE TARIFFS
AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

(1989); David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking:
FirstEstimates, 58 PUB. CHOICE 269, 271 (1988). Hazard, supra note 15, concludes

that the public "seems increasingly convinced that lawyers are simply a plague on
society." Id. at 1239. Daniel Fischel, Dean of the University of Chicago Law
School, has recently suggested that confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege are intended to favor lawyers and not clients, and to give lawyers an unfair
competitive advantage. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1998).

65. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH, act
4, sc. 2. However, the speech is actually read to mean that the villains want to kill
the lawyers to remove the protection of the rule of law so as to institute anarchy.
This was the conclusion of Justice John Paul Stevens in Wallers v. Nat'l. Ass'n. of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 371 n.24 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
DANIEL J. KORNSTEIN, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS: SHAKESPEARE'S LEGAL APPEAL 28-32
(1994).
66. See Russell G. Pearce, The ProfessionalParadigmShift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1231-32 (1995).
67. See Hazard, supra note 15, at 1245.
68. See id. In his subtle and complex analysis of the crisis, Professor Hazard
argues that the legal profession no longer knows either its identity or place in the
social system. See id. at 1239. The "narrative" that the profession once presented
was that it defended private parties against a dangerous and "heavy handed" government, thereby defending life, liberty, and property. Id. at 1244. The acceptance of this narrative has been undercut by the recognition that lawyers primarily
defend business entities and their property rights. See id. at 1245. Defending
business is no longer seen as heroic or legitimate because the reputation of business had been undercut by the Great Depression and the attacks of democratic
politics on capitalism. See id. at 1279. Lawyers mostly defend business property
(after all it is those with property that have something to defend and can afford to
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While some shareholders reaped windfall profits during this period, harsh downsizing, which economists euphemistically call
"transition costs," fell on workers, suppliers, lenders (especially
69
owners of "junk"bonds), and local communities.
The savings and loan fiasco, which required a $500 billion
government bailout, also sullied the reputation of the legal profession. The government sued hundreds of law firms and succeeded in securing large settlements from some of the nation's
largest and most prestigious firms. 70 Because of a crucial procedural irony, government agencies, acting as receivers for the
failed thrifts, were able to waive the attorney-client privilege,
thereby establishing the lawyers' knowing complicity. 7 1 At a
minimum, many lawyers failed to stop massive fraud and some
were implicated in the misconduct. The harm to the reputation
of lawyers was not lessened by the apologia of the organized
72
bar, which looked like a whitewash to observers.
There has always been a tension between lawyers' public
duties as officers of the court and their duty of loyalty to their
clients. Until recently, these conflicting duties were generally
perceived to be in some acceptable balance. By the 1990s, the
balance had seriously eroded 73 in part over confusion as to the
duties of a lawyer whose client was engaged in fraud. It also
became difficult for a profession that was once relatively small
and homogeneous to agree about much of anything after
tripling in size in one generation.7 4 Despite scholars' and jupay lawyers to defend it) and courts no longer treat the protection of property as
comparable to the protection of life or liberty. See id. at 1266.
69. See generally Ronn S. Davids, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing Transition Costs?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 145 (1995).
70. See Peter C. Kostant, When Zeal Boils Over: Disclosure Obligations and
the Duty of Candor of Legal Counsel in Regulatory Proceedings After the Kaye,
Scholer Settlement, 25 ARiz. ST. L.J. 487 (1993). For example, the law firms Kaye
Scholer and Jones Day agreed to settlements with the government for $41 million

and $51 million respectively.
71. See id. at 493.
72. See, e.g., ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993); ABA Working Group on Lawyers' Representation
of Regulated Clients, Laborers in Different Vineyards? The Banking Regulators
and the Legal Profession 197-212 (1993). For an eloquent description of the failure
of the bar adequately to confront or condemn the conduct of Lincoln's lawyers, see
Simon, supra note 40, at 263-67.
73. See Pearce, supra note 66, at 1250-63.
74. See Hazard, supra note 15, at 1259.
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rists' arguments for legal ethics to reflect the widely varying
contexts of contemporary legal practice, 75 the organized bar continues to cling, Procrustes like, to a universalist model, regard76
less of the nature of the transaction or the client.
A "cottage industry" has developed around exploring the
decline of the legal profession. 77 Yale Law School Dean,
Anthony Kronman, is perhaps the most eloquent academic to
contrast current practices with those of a prior era, which if not
quite a Golden Age, was at least made of less base metal. 78 In
Kronman's prudentialist view of legal tradition, by employing
practical wisdom, lawyers were once able to balance their public
responsibilities to the system of justice and society with their
loyalty to their clients. The lawyer-statesmen (there were virtually no women) served the public good by remaining independent of the client and exercising judgment that combined
75. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers
After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1152 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, Factual Fiction in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions Restate the Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903 (1993); Stanley
Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of ProfessionalConduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 (1998).
76. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983, unlike the
prior Model Code, has one section on the role of lawyer for an organizational client
(Rule 1.13) and it also addresses the role of lawyer as counselor (Rules 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3). These additions add little to the primary focus on legal practice as adversarial and clients that are individuals. See Simon, supra note 16, at 7 (discussing
that the dominant view remains adversarial).
77. See Peter Margulies, Progressive Lawyering and Lost Traditions, 73
TExAs L. REV. 1139, 1145 (1993) (stating that "lawyers are in decline as a profession.. . taking the public good with them on the way down.").
78. See KRONMAN, supra note 15. For others who are nostalgic for a golden
age before the decline, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994);
SOL M. LiNowiTz & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); Daniel R. Coquillette, Professional-

ism: The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1271-77 (1994). For others critical of
this nostalgia, see RICHARD L. ABEL, LAwYERS: A CRITICAL READER 131 (1997);
Pearce, supra note 66; Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of
Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996). For a vivid and humorous example
of the power of mythical "golden ages," see SIMONE SIGNORET, NOSTALGIA ISN'T
WHAT IT USED To BE (Harper & Row 1978) (1976) (autobiography of the great
French actress). According to Ovid, there were no lawyers in the original "Golden
Age." "Aurea prima stata est aetas, quae vindice nullo / sine lege, sponte sua fidem
rectumque colebat." Translation: "The first age was golden, which without any
lawyers, with no law, of its own accord brought forth good faith and upstanding
behavior." OVID, METAMORPHOSIS, BOOK I. (Prof. Jonathan Gutoff trans., on file
with author).
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sympathy or a sympathetic identification with the client, with
professional detachment. Kronman provides many reasons why
lawyers lost the ability to engage in this persuasive dialogue
with clients including greed, increasing bureaucracy, and "scientific pretensions" about the nature of law.7 9 Adjusting the
duty of confidentiality may help lawyers to regain an independent status. Although confidentiality may be essential in litigation, the duty to disclose material information would provide
the transactional lawyers working for MDPs with a self-interested moral compass and leverage against client agents engaged in wrongdoing, enabling them to act more like statesmen.
IV.

Similarities Between Accountants and
Corporate Lawyers

Conventional wisdom holds that lawyers and accountants
serve very different roles for their clients. In United States v.
Arthur Young & Co.,8 0 the United States Supreme Court explained that the lawyer's duty is to serve as "his client's confidential advisor and advocate" and "to present the client's case
in the most favorable possible light."8 ' The Supreme Court contrasts this with the independent certified public accountant
whose "public responsibility transcends any employment relationship with the client," and who owes "allegiance to the corporations' creditors and stockholders, as well as the investing
82
public."
While the clear contrast the Supreme Court identifies provides an excellent encapsulation of the universalistic legal ethic
adopted by the organized bar,8 3 the Court is not describing the
reality of what many lawyers traditionally do. In practice, cor79. KRONmAN, supra note 15, at 225-70.
80. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
81. Id. at 817-18.
82. Id. (finding no accountant/client evidentiary privilege or work product
protection).
83. The Model Rules, which the ABA adopted in 1983, purport to distinguish
between the lawyer as advocate, counselor and intermediary. The rules also have
one section on representing organizational clients. Nevertheless, commentators
have correctly concluded that the Model Rules still treat law as a unitary profession; that despite conceding the existence of different roles, there are no different
standards for context; and that the universalist ethic rhetoric makes it more difficult to examine specific representation contexts. See Wilkins, supra note 75, at
1152.
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porate lawyers perform transactional work, not litigation. The
roles of "advisor" and "advocate" that the Court distinguishes
from those of accountants need not be automatically bound together as they are in the Court's opinion.8 4 That clients always
need confidentiality protection offered by lawyers, but not accountants, is questionable when applied to the large public corporation.8 5 Our legal and economic understanding of large
public corporations has expanded, and their governance and
norms have changed. The distinction between a lawyer's duties
to the corporate "client" on one hand and an accountant's duties
to "creditors, shareholders [i.e., corporate constituents] and the
investing public" that the Court stresses is in fact much less
clear.8 6 The Court's opinion ignores the similar economic function that both transactional lawyers and accountants play as
reputational intermediaries for their corporate clients.8 7
The similarity in the roles of accountants and transactional
lawyers in federal securities law further illustrate their complementary economic function. Generally, accountants and law84. For example, why does strict confidentiality and the existence of a broad
corporate attorney-client privilege encourage internal investigations and compliance with the law for corporate clients, see Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981), but protecting communications with accountants, the essential public
watchdog, is unnecessary? Some commentators oppose any attorney-client privilege for corporate clients. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The
Mythology of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157
(1993); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 283-84 (1986). Dean Daniel

Fischel has concluded that protecting corporate client confidences either has no
effect or actually decreases legal compliance. If a corporation intends to comply,
confidentiality is unnecessary; if uncertain about compliance and legal advice is
not confidential, the client may decide not to risk engaging in illegal activity, but if
advice was confidential it could better weigh the risk and even learn how not to get
caught; and finally confidentiality decreases sanctions for past misconduct and increases the ability to cover it up, but it does not increase the incentive to comply
with the law. See Fischel, supra note 64.
85. See Fischel supra note 64, at 25 (the accounting profession, as reputational intermediaries, has survived legal rules that require disclosure of work papers, including notes of client interviews).
86. The clear distinction made in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465
U.S. 805 (1984) represents a misunderstanding of the similarities in the function
of accountants and transactional lawyers, and that treating all lawyers as "advocates" can be damaging. This is especially true for corporate lawyers who may
aggressively "advocate" the position of inside, senior managers against the interests of the entity that is the real client.
87. See id. See also Simon, supra note 40, at 261. Reputational intermediaries help to overcome information asymmetries by placing their own credibility behind those for whom they act. See Fischel, supra note 64, at 20-21.
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yers are subject to the same professional standards in practice
before the SEC. Pursuant to Rule 102(e)88 (this Rule was previously numbered 2(e) and will be referred to as such hereinafter)
the SEC may censure or suspend any "professional" from practicing before the Commission. The SEC generally holds attor-9
neys and accountants to the same ethical standards.8
Commissioner Randolph, in a recent concurring opinion, reiterated that "neither Rule 2(e), nor the court's recognition of it,
have ever drawn a distinction between accountants and
attorneys ."90
88. These proceedings against lawyers or accountants generally arise out of
situations where a client's conduct initiated the underlying violation. Joel Seligman has underscored the importance of SEC 2(e) proceedings as regulating fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in corporate governance. He argues that accounting
is the language of corporate governance, and the SEC's proceedings against professionals for the misconduct of issuers is the most productive place to look for the
reality of the enforcement of director's fiduciary duties to corporations. See Joel
Seligman, Accounting and the New Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943,
945 (1993). The SEC stressed that most practice before the Commission is nonadversarial and the Commission must be able to rely on the candor of those that
practice before it. The SEC observed that "[v] ery little of a securities lawyer's work
is adversary in character. He doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of
vigilant adversaries and alert judges checks him. He works in his office where he
prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the financial community, and the investing public must
take on faith." In re Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262, 266 n.20 (1973). See also Richard W.
Painter & Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud:Establishing a Firm Foundation,50 SMU L. REV. 225, 227 (1996).
89. There is some evidence that different standards are sometimes used for
lawyers and accountants. The Commission has generally not sought to develop or
apply independent standards of conduct for attorneys, and the great majority of
2(e) proceedings against attorneys have involved violations of the federal securities
laws. The Commission has used 2(e) proceedings to explain its views about professional standards applicable to accountants. See also In re Nielseon, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-16,479 (Karmel, dissenting) ("Disciplinary action against accountants and attorneys must rest on very different legal analyses and involves very
different policy questions."). In Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 456 (D.C. Cir.
1994) before the D.C. Circuit remand, the Commission tried to apply a negligence
standard for accountant misconduct, while it had used "wrongful intent" for attorneys inCarter & Johnson. In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 3417,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 182,847 at 84,172 (Feb. 28,
1981). See also In re Danna & Dentinger, Exchange Act Release No. 34-38,499
SEC Docket 208 (Apr. 11, 1995) (applying a negligence standard to accountants
but failing to reason why a scienter standard was required for lawyers in
Checkosky).
90. Checkosky v. S.E.C., 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the reasoning in the prior Carter & Johnson opinion would apply equally to auditors or
attorneys; that the text of 2(e) does not distinguish between accountants and law-
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Although the crucial ethical concept of "independence" may
not have identical meanings for both professions, accountants
and lawyers have always stressed their independence and adherence to strict professional standards derived from autonomous self-regulating authorities, the AICPA and the ABA.
Additionally, both professions are subject to oversight from governmental regulators and the courts.9 ' There is also an important body of case law finding both lawyers and accountants
liable for negligently failing to protect corporate clients from the
misconduct of client managers. The cases do not treat lawyers
92
and accountants differently.
yers; and that in 1979 in In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 34-15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,124 (July
2, 1979), Chairman Williams' concurring opinion noted that "neither Rule 2(e), nor
the courts' recognition of it, has ever drawn a distinction between accountants and
attorneys").
91. The accounting profession has not been immune from crisis. Between
1989 and 1994 the Big Six accounting firms paid $395.82 million to settle class
actions; the total paid by all firms was $482 million. See Painter & Duggan, supra
note 88, at 236. Judge Sporkin, speaking of accountants as well as lawyers, rhetorically asked, "Where were these professionals?" referring to the misconduct that
lead to the savings and loan disaster. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F.
Supp 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990).
92. For cases finding either attorneys or accountants liable, see FDIC v.
O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding it irrelevant that wrongdoers who stood to benefit owned nearly all the corporate clients stock); FDIC v.
Clark, 978 F.2d 1541 (10th Cir. 1992) (determining that the illegal activity was to
benefit individuals and not corporate clients); Schact v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th
Cir. 1992) (finding the illegal activity enabled the corporation to exist and continue
to operate after it became insolvent, and that its prolonged life did not benefit the
corporation); Resolution Trust Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 845 F. Supp. 621
(N.D. Ill. 1994); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 915 F. Supp. 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
67 Cal. App. 4th 1481 (Ct. App. Second Dist. 1998).
For cases where no liability was found, see FDIC v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d
166 (5th Cir. 1992); Hanover Corp. v. Beckner, 211 B. R. 849 (M.D. La. 1997);
FDIC v. Schrader & York, 991 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1993).
Another leading case that did not find liability was Cenco v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982). Here the accountants were able to impute management misconduct to the corporate client because the illegal conduct was
directed primarily against "outsiders" and the corporation's shareholders benefited. The case does acknowledge that loyal but misguided employees may try to
benefit both the corporation and themselves and that directors might sometimes
be liable for negligently not discovering misconduct. The case concludes that the
primary monitor should be the board, and directors can read the case to encourage
meaningful reliance on receiving full disclosure from outside professionals.
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In a companion essay for The Pace Law Review Symposium, John Humbach, Professor of Law at Pace University
School of Law, wrote a telling critique of the legal profession.
Professor Humbach describes how traditional norms of practice
have a destructive effect on the system of justice lawyers intend
to serve. 93 Under the traditional model, which other commentators have called the "standard conception" 94 of lawyering, the
lawyer's purported right to finesse the truth has expanded to
become a veritable duty to mislead. 95 One reason for the slippery slope leading to deception, as explained by William Simon,
is that the "norms of practice require [the lawyer] to take actions that frustrate the values to which she is supposed to be
committed." 96 Humbach argues persuasively that the kind of
trickery lawyers practice does not belong in the adversarial sys97
tem of litigation before an important tribunal.
Even if justified as the dominant concept of practice for formal litigation, 98 the organized bar's interpretation of client confidentiality has no place in transactional practice where there is
no tribunal to weigh the truth. Nevertheless, ethical rules still
encourage it. Thus, Model Rule 4.1(b), 99 which requires a lawyer to correct material misrepresentations by a client, is rendered meaningless by the duty not to disclose confidential
information. 10 0 For this reason, Model Rule 4.1(b) 10 1 pretends to
93. See John A. Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An
Essay on Honesty, "Lawyer Honesty" and the Public Trust in the Legal System, 20
PACE L. REV. 93 (1999).
94. WILLIAM H. SIMON, supra note 16, at 218 n.8.

95. See Humbach, supra note 93, at 94-98.
96. Simon, supra note 16, at 367 (stressing that client loyalty is not an end in
itself; but rather, it is a norm designed to further vindicate legal principles. When
the malfunctioning of coordinate institutions indicate that it can no longer serve
that purpose, then practices need to be modified).
97. See Humbach, supra note 93.
98. See DAVID Luban, INTRODUCTION TO THE ETHICS OF LAWYERS at XVII
(1994).
99. Model Rule 4.1(b) states in relevant part:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: ... b) fail
to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by rule 1.6.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 4.1 (1999).

100. See id.
101. See supra note 99 for the text of Rule 4.1.
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favor truthfulness while actually forbidding

it.102

As adopted,

the rule underscores that in resolving the tension between a
lawyer's duty to her client and to society as an officer of the
10 3
court, it is society that loses.
Under the ethical rules that preceded the Model Rules, attorneys had a duty to rectify their clients' fraud. 10 4 However,
the ABA completely excused that duty in the 1983 adoption of
the Model Rules. 10 5 Moreover, the broad duty of confidentiality
has expanded far beyond the narrow attorney-client privilege. 10 6 The attorney-client privilege, like all legal privileges, is
an exception to the general legal principle of accepting all relevant information in seeking the truth. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege is narrow in scope. The privilege never
covers communications in furtherance of a crime or fraud because such communications are not part of a lawyer's proper
function in providing legal assistance. 0 7 Unfortunately, the
narrow attorney-client privilege has been expanded by the bar
into the over-broad ethical duty of confidentiality. While the attorney-client privilege previously co-existed uncomfortably with
an offsetting duty to rectify client fraud under the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, 0 8 the duty of confidentiality has
metastasized into Rules 1.6,109 1.13110 and 4.1(b)"' of the Model
102. See

HAZARD

&

HODES,

supra note 37, 4.1:101, at 711 (arguing that the

express language of Rule 4.1(b) must be given a "savings" construction to avoid

this unfortunate result).
103. See Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failureof Nerve: The Bar's Response
to Kaye Scholer, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 315, 320 (1998).
104. The ABA's Code of Professional Ethics contained a duty to rectify client
fraud for which the lawyer's services had been utilized. Because this conflicted
with the duty to keep client information privileged, the Model Code was amended
in 1972 to subordinate this duty. In 1975, ABA Formal Op. 341, (Sept. 30, 1975),
the scope was expanded to include not only privileged information but all client
confidences. Most states did not adopt the 1972 amendment. The Model Rules do
not contain any duty to rectify client fraud except a rather vague one concerning
tribunals (Model Rule 3.3) that is generally irrelevant to corporate practice. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Rule 3.3 (1999).

id.
id.
WOLFRAM,

supra note
id. at Rule
id. at Rule
id. at Rule

supra note 84, at 279-82.
104.
1.6 (1999).
1.13 (1999).
4.1(b) (1999).
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Rules, making it unethical for a lawyer to disclose confidences
to prevent or rectify client fraud.
Another aspect of what could be called a duty to mislead, is
what the former Chief Counsel 12 for the Office of Thrift Supervision, a powerful governmental regulator, called the practice of
loophole lawyering.ll 3 Rather than applying the whole law,
lawyers act as advocates by using technicalities to enable their
clients to engage in unlawful activities, or to delay regulators in
stopping client misconduct." 4 This is what appears to have
been done by many lawyers during the savings and loan
debacle.
The bar's official ethical rules have sanctified the duty to
mislead. The lawyer as "trickster" is a poor reputational intermediary for her honest client given the "lemons market" problem. Despite the fact that Model Rule 1.7(a) prohibits a lawyer
form representing a client if it will be "directly adverse" to another client, and Rule 1.7 prohibits representation that "may be
materially limited by ... responsibilities to another client or to
a third person," these problems are currently ignored by the
transactional lawyer who withholds material information to
protect a devious client. The legal ethic was not always interpreted in this way. Writing in 1836, David Hoffman, one of the
best known commentators on legal ethics of the day, recognized
his duty to other clients. He explained that he would never
press evidence or a principle wholly at variance with sound law,
"when if successful it would be a gangrene that might bring
death to my cause of the succeeding day."" 5 This has contributed to the popular conceptions of lawyers as tricksters, playing
a game to hide the truth. By following a set of universal rules
based upon an adversarial ethical model lawyers can avoid having to make tough ethical judgments about their clients. As a
result, lawyers seldom have to decline lucrative fees from ethically dubious clients. At the same time, the universal non-contextual rules make it more difficult for innocent third parties to
112. Harris Weinstein was the Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
113. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 549 & n.13 (1994).
114. See id.
115. SIMON, supra note 16, at 63.
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avoid injury. At least in the transactional, non-litigation context, the lawyer as trickster game may be beginning to change.
Large corporate clients that are repeat players can hire lawyers
in non-litigation transactions that work for MDPs and add
value as reputational intermediaries. 116
Critics of MDP legal practice postulate a loss in zealous
representation and advocacy. This criticism rests on the false
premise that adversarial advocacy is the sole function of lawyers. 117 When clients are using the lawyer's services in ongoing
transactions to harm third parties, the duty of loyalty and the
preservation of client confidences need closer examination. In
such cases, the values that underlie these norms are very different than when lawyers are defending clients charged with past
wrongdoing by an all-powerful government. 118
The resulting duty of full disclosure of material information
could provide real value to clients by making transactional lawyers effective reputational intermediaries. Without this duty,
reputable clients suffer from the "lemons market" problem, because third parties cannot distinguish them from others for
whom lawyers have a duty to conceal harmful information. 119

116. See Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and ContractarianParadigms
in the Uneasy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 158-59 (1996) (discussing repeat players, in the context of regulators and regulated firms, as those who deal with each other on multiple occasions);
see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 6-7 (1994) (discussing strategic behavior and its relation to different paradigms of game theory).
117. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
118. See generally Simon, supra note 40, at 277-79.
119. The economist George A. Akerloff described how unequal information
can cause the adverse selection problem that results in a "lemons market" for
automobiles. Because sellers of lemons know that they are lemons while buyers do
not, more lemons are sold because sellers of lemons will be paid somewhat more
than the value of a lemon. Buyers eventually realize that they have a greater
chance of buying a lemon, and the price of the cars fall. Good car owners become
less likely to sell and eventually only lemons are sold. See George A. Akerloff, The
Market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J.
ECON. 488, 500 (1970); THoMAs C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR
99-100 (1978) (utilizing Akerloffs "lemon market" theory as a useful model for analyzing relationships and interdependent behavior and to describe what is known as
the critical- mass phenomenon).
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PARADIGM REGAINED
Paradigm Regained: Corporate Lawyers As Lawyer 120
Statesmen

As discussed above, the need to satisfy increasingly independent directors and audit committees, as well as competition from MDPs, is changing how corporate lawyers can behave.
For corporate lawyers, these developments are accelerating the
shift away from the traditional universal ethical paradigm.
During most of this century, the traditional professionalism
paradigm helped maintain conformity in theory and practice
and helped to resolve tensions. Under the traditional professionalism paradigm, lawyers needed to be independent in order
to reconcile the needs of their clients with the needs of society
and the system of justice. In practice, this meant being in12
dependent from government interference and self-regulation. '
As Fordham Law School Professor Russell Pearce explained,
120. While I argue that recent developments, including powerful competition
from accounting firms, may help corporate lawyers to behave in more independent
and socially responsible manner, I also recognize that the "paradigm" to be
'regained" may never have existed to any significant degree, and to the extent that
it did exist, it was plagued with other serious drawbacks, i.e., elitism, racism, and
sexism. Nevertheless, in speaking of a "paradigm regained" I am trying to use the
kind of "irony" that Peter Margulies characterizes as recognizing the tension
between reality and how things should be, not as "facile skepticism" but with a "set
of normative commitments that impel one to act even as one acknowledges
doubts." Margulies, supra note 77, at 1176.
121. Pearce, supra note 66, at 1231. Pearce argues that the original "Republican Paradigm" was of a legal profession comprised of individual professionals who
were above the self-interest of the marketplace and who served as guardians of the
public good. Id. at 1241. This paradigm fell victim to the industrial realities of the
late 19' h Century and was replaced at about the turn of the century with the 'Professionalism Paradigm" which gave lawyers the exclusive privilege to provide legal
services and be largely autonomous from external regulation. In return, lawyers
as professionals, unlike business-people, would altruistically place the good of
their clients and society above their own self-interest. Id. at 1238. The Professionalism Paradigm contained the Profit Maximizer Taboo (not to treat law as a commodity) and the Business Servant Taboo (not to favor client over social interests).
See id. at 1242-44. Over the course of the 20 t' Century because of many factors,
including the commercialization of more competitive legal practice, the tremendous growth in the number of lawyers and the decreasing professional mystique,
and lawyer advertising, law did indeed become a commodity. The public also
ceased to believe that lawyers would exercise independent judgment and did not
believe that lawyers would not place client interests over the good of society. See
id. at 1240. Professor Pearce optimistically believes that a new paradigm, the
"Business Paradigm" is being realized, which in what he calls its "middle-range"
can combine the advantages of the market system with a communitarian moral
vision. Id. at 1265-76. I learned a great deal from Pearce's excellent broad analy-

25

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:43

this belief system required that lawyers not be viewed as profit
maximizers (in part, because law was not a commodity) or as
servants of business. 122 In time, the paradigm was discredited,
123
as lawyers became functionaries of business.
During the time period in which the traditional paradigm
had vitality, theorists used it to reject inconsistent ideas without having to evaluate their significance. Despite its abuses,
and in the absence of any supporting empirical data, 124 strict
25
confidentiality remained part of the rhetoric of client welfare.1
The growth of corporate transactional practice, however, leads
to puzzles within the paradigm. These puzzles and changes in
the internal governance of the clients, grew to become anomalies, provoking a crisis that the discourse had to try to exclude.
In this way, the organized bar continued to insist on a unitary
profession with increasingly strict rules of confidentiality, except when a lawyer's personal interest was involved. Moreover,
the organized bar afforded excessive deference to corporate
managers and as a result the duty to rectify client fraud
withered away. Regulators, and occasionally courts, insisted on
broader duties, but the bar largely ignored them or treated
126
them with calumny.
The key failure for the traditional professionalism paradigm was that society eventually recognized that it could not
trust lawyers to use their independent judgment not to place
the interests of their clients, especially large corporations,
above those of society. This belief system broke down at least in
part because of the conspicuous role of lawyers in the savings
sis, but in this article I am focusing only on corporate lawyers and changes in the
context of corporate practice.
122. See Pearce, supra note 66, at 1242.
123. See generally Simon, supra note 40, at 266.
124. See SIMON, supra note 16, at 56.
125. Anticipations of later paradigms did exist in the past, and lawyers before
the adoption of the Model Rules in 1983 did have a duty to rectify client fraud, but
these duties were deleted from the Model Rules because they were purported to
conflict with more important values. See discussion supra notes 104, 108 and accompanying text.
126. See Susan Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others
Frame it at Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (1993) (discussing the bar's preferred duty of non-disclosure and the failure of courts to articulate clear
standards).
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and loan debacle, 127 and the corporate takeover frenzy of the
1980s. 128 Corporate governance also changed and independent

boards began to demand different legal services. Sophisticated
corporate clients no longer suffered from the same asymmetries
of legal information, and lawyers no longer had special knowledge that their clients lacked. 29 Eventually, even the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged 130that the business/profession dichotomy was an anachronism.
In the new contextual paradigm that is developing, corporate lawyers, whether they work for MDPs, law firms or inhouse, may, in fact, be more independent because they serve an
increasingly independent board rather than acting as the servants of powerful inside managers. In helping the independent
board to mediate among corporate constituencies, lawyers may
be able to engage in a deliberative process that bears some re131
semblance to Kronman's lawyer-statesman.
History provides examples of how lawyers, when confronted with effective competition from non-lawyers, developed
high ethical standards. When bar associations and courts have
exclusive power to make regulations, there has been relatively
little political accountability. 132 On the other hand, in areas in
which both lawyers and non-lawyers are permitted to compete
to provide services (i.e., tax, patent, lobbying and bill collecting),
courts and bar associations have less authority and standards
may be higher. 33 As discussed above, in SEC 2(e) proceedings,
lawyers and non-lawyer accountants are held to largely the
same ethical rules, 34 and a very high standard applies.
127. See generally Kostant, supra note 70, at 11.

128. See Peter C. Kostant, Exit Voice and Loyalty in the Course of Corporate
Governance and Counsel's Changing Role, 28 Journal of Socio-Economics 203, 215
(1999).
129. See Gilson, supra note 62, at 900-01.
130. See Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977) ("the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism").
131. See Kostant, supra note 128, at 243-45 (analyzing the proper role for corporate lawyers as honest brokers for directors who can better serve the corporate
entity by being fair to all constituencies, and arguing that the existing position of
corporate counsel as lawyers for inside management cannot be supported and is
destructive of sound corporate governance).
132. See Ted Schneyer, Legal ProcessScholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 40-42 (1986).
133. See id.
134. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the clearest example of lawyers being held to consistently high ethical standards of complete candor is the patent
bar, which traditionally competed with non-lawyers who were
able to act as patent agents. In making a patent application,
the client and the attorney each have an independent duty 135 to
report "all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness
underlying the [patent] application in issue." 136 Courts have described the relationship between applicant and government examiner in fiduciary duty terms because the relationship is a
confidential one and not "at arms length."137 The standards of
candor for patent lawyers have always been very high. In one
important case, the United States Supreme Court affirmed an
order disbarring a patent attorney 38 who had participated in a
scheme to deceive the Patent Office. 39 His client, Hartford-Empire Co., intended to "prepare and publish, over the signature of
an apparently disinterested labor leader, an article to be published and then used in support of the company's pending patent application."'140 The article, published in a trade journal,
was later presented to the Patent Office as "recognition by a 'reluctant witness' of the success of the device under
4
consideration."1 1
The defendant attorney, Dorsey, was one of four attorneys
accused of deceiving the Patent Office as to the authorship of
the article, which influenced the Patent Office's decision in regard to the patent. 142 The three other lawyers involved were
also disbarred. In his appeal, Dorsey claimed that he had never
made a false statement to the Patent Office. Justice Robert H.
Jackson agreed, writing in his dissent that "[tihe worst that can
135. See 37 C.F.R. Sec. 1.56 (1999). The regulation requires a duty to disclose
information material to probability. Because patents are of public concern, individuals associated with the filing of patents must deal with utmost good faith and
candor. See id.
136. PrecisionInstrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 818 (1945). Cf. Crites, Inc. v. PrudentialCo. 322 U.S. 408, 415 (1944).
137. Id. See also True Tempe Corp. v. C.F.& I. Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 501
(10th Cir. 1979).
138. See Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949). This case is discussed in
Kostant, supra note 70 at 535-36.

139. Id.
140.
322 U.S.
141.
142.

Id. at 321. See generally Hazel-Athens Glass Co. v. Hartford-EmpireCo.,
238 (1944).
Dorsey, 338 U.S. at 321.
See Hatch v. Ooms, 69 F. Supp. 788, 790 (D.D.C. 1947).
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be said of Dorsey is that he took advantage of this loose practice
to use a trade journal article as evidence, without disclosing
that it was ghost-written for the ostensible author."14 3 Justice
Jackson noted that Dorsey had practiced law for 59 years "without blemish" 1 to his record, and that "not only is there no claim
that the ...article contained one false statement, but there is
no denial that, whoever was the scribe, [the purported author]
14 5
believed and knowingly adopted as his own every word of it."
The majority of the justices, however, found Dorsey to be in
gross violation of congressional policy to protect the public from
the "evil consequences that might result if practitioners should
betray their high trust." 14 6 Citing the Patent Office Committee
on Enrollment and Disbarment, the Court in Dorsey stated:
"[iun its relation to applicants, the Office . . .must rely upon
their integrity and deal with them in a spirit of trust and confidence."147 Candor can build trust and efficient business operations. There is no reason why it need apply only in patent
regulation.
In another article, I have explored at length how the
mechanics of corporate governance are changing so that shareholders and other corporate constituencies are increasingly employing voice rather than exit as an ameliorative device. 48 In
this new governance regime, corporate lawyers are uniquely
qualified to act as "gyroscope" and honest broker for independent directors. In playing this role, corporate lawyers can help to
protect the entity and all its constituents from the wrong doing
of corporate managers. The enhanced duty of candor of MDP
transactional lawyers could help to achieve this objective.
VI.

Conclusion

Traditional legal ethics attempted to justify many of its tenets with claims that they were in the best interests of clients.
Today, large public corporations are extremely sophisticated
consumers of legal services who are able to judge their own
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Dorsey, 338 U.S. at 323 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 320.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 319.
See generally Kostant, supra note 128.
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needs. By hiring MDP lawyers, such clients are challenging
two of the organized bar's most basic assumptions. First, these
clients are rejecting the notion that all lawyers must act as
though they are involved in adverse practice. To paraphrase
Lenin's description of the suffrage of the Russian Army in 1917,
these corporations by hiring MDPs are voting with their feet.
By choosing MDPs that have a duty to make full disclosure in
audits rather than acting as advocates in an adversarial system, they are instead opting for a much more valuable and
nuanced kind of loyalty from their lawyers. Second, by rejecting
the bar's traditional prohibition against sharing profits with
non-lawyers, large corporate clients are preventing the organized bar from continuing to rely upon independence arguments
to insulate their conduct from requirements that they provide
what their clients really need. 149 If the changing market for
legal services is forcing lawyers to serve their clients better, 150
who could plausibly argue that these changes are not beneficial?
It is time for the bar to reject the outdated canard that lawyers
are necessarily more ethical than business people.' 5 '

149. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers? 105 HAav. L. REV.
799, 858-63 (1992) (arguing that independence arguments can help insulate lawyers from client pressures).
150. See Gilson, supra note 62 (stressing the importance of the demand side of
the market by sophisticated clients but reaching a less optimistic conclusion).
151. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 66, at 1266 (pointing to "reinterpretation of
business as a worthy endeavor" and the work of commentators like Thomas Shaffer and Mary Ann Glendon rejecting "characterization of business persons as morally inferior to lawyers."); Gilson, supra note 62, at 871 ("economists do not view
the label 'business' as perjorative. If becoming a business means efficiently rendering an important service in a competitive environment, then of what is there to
complain").
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